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Abstract
On September the 4th 2010 and February 22nd 2011 
the Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by 
two massive earthquakes. This paper is set broadly 
within the civil defence and emergency management 
literature and informed by recent work on community 
participation and social capital in the building of resilient 
cities. Work in this area indicates a need to recognise 
both the formal institutional response to the earthquakes 
as well as the substantive role communities play in their 
own recovery. The range of factors that facilitate or 
hinder community involvement also needs to be better 
understood. This paper interrogates the assumption 
that recovery agencies and officials are both willing 
and able to engage communities who are themselves 
willing and able to be engaged in accordance with 
recovery best practice. Case studies of three community 
groups – CanCERN, Greening the Rubble and Gap 
Filler – illustrate some of the difficulties associated 
with becoming a community during the disaster 
recovery phase. Based on my own observations and 
experiences, combined with data from approximately 
50 in-depth interviews with Christchurch residents 
and representatives from community groups, the 
Christchurch City Council, the Earthquake Commission 
and so on, this paper outlines some practical strategies 
emerging communities may use in the early disaster 
recovery phase that then strengthens their ability to 
‘participate’ in the recovery process.
Keywords: community development; community 
participation; urban resilience; social capital
Early Disaster Recovery: A Guide for Communities
Introduction
On September 4th 2010, at 4.36 am, the Canterbury 
region was rocked by a large 7.1 magnitude earthquake. 
We later learned that there had been no casualties 
and that the damage was largely confined to particular 
areas of the city of Christchurch and parts of Kaiapoi 
in the neighbouring Waimakariri District. For the people 
living in those areas, life became a constant battle. 
In contrast, most of Christchurch city’s residents and 
the Christchurch City Council tried to move back to 
‘business as usual’; they had almost succeeded when a 
‘smaller’ though more devastating earthquake occurred 
almost directly under the city.1 This time, 181 people 
were killed (most of them in the collapse of two large 
inner city buildings), and many more were injured. An as 
yet unconfirmed number of people have lost their homes 
though it is estimated to be between 8000-12000. Some 
of these (again, numbers are not yet known) will not be 
rebuilt because the land damage underneath them is 
so extensive. 
This provides some background for a paper which 
presents the findings of an exploration of the strategies 
three particular community groups in Christchurch used 
in their collective response to the first of the major 
earthquake. Whilst the initial research project aimed 
to explore community-recovery authority relationships 
and interactions in broad terms, the project later 
crystallised around the formation and development of 
three community groups: the Canterbury Communities 
Earthquake Recovery Network (CanCERN) who 
advocate for the inclusion of communities in recovery 
processes, and Gap Filler and Greening the Rubble 
who both focus on temporary installations on sites 
made vacant by the earthquake. Greening the Rubble 
promotes bio-diversity through the development 
of pocket parks, whilst Gap Filler celebrates the 
development of places that serve ‘creative, people-
centred purposes’ such as mobile cafes, movie theatres, 
and even a bowling alley. 
1 The peak ground acceleration of the second quake was 2.2 times that of gravity and was one of the highest recording taken anywhere. 
According to Professor Yeats, professor emeritus of geology at Oregon State University in Corvallis, this would have ‘flattened’ most world cities 
(http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-earthquake/4711189/Tuesday-quake-no-aftershock).
2 This term, like ‘engagement’, ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’, is problematic and subject to extensive debate as to its meaning conceptually 
and in practice.
3 See Aldrich, 2011 or French, 2011 for recent summaries of a general nature.
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Disaster recovery and community 
involvement
Much of the recovery literature recognises both 
difficulties and advantages associated with involving2 
the local community in disaster recovery efforts.3 Kweit 
and Kweit (2004), for example, compared recovery 
processes in Grand Forks and East Grand Forks 
following severe floods in 1997. After the disaster, East 
Grand Forks engaged in extensive citizen participation 
initiatives and subsequently reported high levels of 
political stability and citizen satisfaction. In contrast, 
Grand Forks instigated a more top-down, bureaucratic 
approach and has since experienced changes to 
their government structure, a high turnover of elected 
and appointed officials, and more negative citizens’ 
evaluations. Besides this, Etye (2004) argues that 
‘getting involved’ after a disaster can be cathartic and 
notes that taking positive action can make victims feel 
empowered; this helps recovery. Other studies report on 
stalled recoveries that were facilitated, or resurrected, 
by a turn to citizen engagement and more deliberative 
democratic models (Coghlan, 2004; Coles and Buckle, 
2004; Waugh and Streib, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Hauser, 
Sherry and Swartz, 2008; Wilson, 2009; Vallance, 2011). 
In such literature, the benefits of effective community 
engagement are variously represented as identifying 
workable solutions to the range of problems recovery 
presents, sharing and delegation of duties, securing 
community ‘buy-in’ to the process, and building trust. 
As Norman (2004, p. 40) has succinctly argued, ‘While 
consensus may not be possible, recovery cannot 
succeed if the aims, priorities and processes do not 
have community support’. 
Another strand of literature that addresses the role of the 
community in disaster recovery comes under the rubric 
of social capital, which is often referred to as the mix 
of ‘strong and weak ties’ that bind different elements of 
society both vertically and horizontally (Putnam, 1995; 
but also Manyena et al., 2011; Lorenz, 2010; Norris, 
2008; Murphy, 2007; Walker and Salt, 2006; Pelling 
and High, 2005; Boettke et al, 2007). Social capital 
may be used to bond a group together; bridge groups 
with similar interests; link groups vertically in formal 
institutional arrangements; or brace between public 
and private sectors. 
Social capital is thought to contribute to general 
resilience which is variously defined as the ability of a 
system to ‘bounce back’ from, ‘cope with’ or ‘bounce 
forward’ from a disturbance (see Vallance, 2011; Cutter, 
Barnes and Berry, 2008; Norris, et al., 2008). Given 
the right conditions, such as having an enabling local 
government and/or adaptive capacity, some scholars 
are even optimistic about the ways a strong civil society 
with good social capital can turn a disaster into an 
opportunity (Solnit, 2009). 
The problem at the core of this paper is that despite a 
broad consensus regarding the benefits of strong social 
capital4 and community involvement, it is not always 
easy to follow engagement best practice in the post-
disaster recovery scramble. Much of the scholarship 
outlining the benefits of public engagement seems to 
assume that the state will be both willing and able to 
accept post-disaster input from communities who are 
themselves willing and able to participate in the recovery 
process. My research here in Christchurch suggests 
recovery authorities here (including, but not limited to, 
the Earthquake Commission, Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Commission and the Christchurch City 
Council) struggled to connect adequately with affected 
communities for quite some time. 
This is a controversial claim, though it is well-supported 
in interview data with both residents and representatives 
from recovery authorities. A Community Board 
representative told me she had encountered strong 
resistance to her idea of holding a local meeting a 
week after the first earthquake and was informed that 
the Council wouldn’t pay out for the tea and coffee, nor 
help with the table and chairs. When she suggested 
driving around the affected areas with a megaphone to 
inform residents without electricity of what to do a City 
Councillor ‘snapped’ at her ‘that is EQC’s job’. It took 
until mid-November (approximately 9 weeks) for the 
first Christchurch City Council ‘Community Meetings’ 
to be held and even then, places were limited. This 
was quite a lengthy wait for residents desperate to 
understand what was going to happen to their homes. 
Numerous Letters to the Editor in the Press and on-
line discussions, blogs and posts document a litany of 
complaints about poor information flows and a general 
lack of communication; the recovery effort was even 
described as a ‘bureaucratic, spin- doctored disaster, [a] 
cock-up like New Orleans’ Hurricane Katrina’ (McCrone, 
2011). 
This struggle to engage adequately with the public 
after a disaster is not entirely without precedent in New 
Zealand: Using the IAP2 spectrum of participation5 
in an analysis of New Zealand’s Ohura floods, for 
4 Though see Aldrich (2008) and Rydin and Holman (2004) for a critique.
5 www.iap2.org/associations/4748/files/IAP2%20Spectrum_vertical.pdf
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example, Ward, Becker and Johnston (2008) suggested 
the official state response barely moved beyond the 
‘consultation’ stage. Consulting is some distance away 
from the deliberative and participatory models that are 
more likely to foster social capital and facilitate the 
development of holistic solutions (see, for example, 
Agyeman and Briony, 2003). 
In their discussion of recovery lessons learned in Kobe 
and Northridge, Olshansky, Johnson and Topping 
(2006, p. 368-9) noted that citizen engagement is key 
but ‘to work most effectively after disasters, community 
organizations should already be in place and have 
working relationships with the city [officials]. It is difficult 
to invent participatory processes in the intensity of a 
post-disaster situation’. This ‘invention of participatory 
processes’ is the primary concern of this paper, though 
it is addressed here largely from several communities’ 
perspectives. It speaks to a comment Daryl Taylor6 made 
about a difference between engaging communities and 
engaging with communities. The distinction is subtle 
but draws attention to pre-existing communities that 
can be engaged with, and emergent communities 
that may need to be engaged. It raises interesting 
questions about the actions community groups can 
take, or strategies they can use, to come together after 
a disaster, and then build and use social capital ‘on the 
fly’ so as to take advantage of the opportunities disaster 
recovery provides. This paper seeks to inform answers 
to these questions. 
Methodology
The findings outlined below are part of an evolving 
research project which, in more general terms, seeks 
to explore communities’ attempts to create particular 
senses of place. This focus on the ‘informal’ aspects 
of urban management after disasters demands a 
suitable methodology, one that acknowledges dynamic 
complexity, relationality and contingency. Mindful 
of concerns about the conduct of research and the 
‘deadening’ effect that orthodox research approaches 
visit upon that which should be most lively (Lorrimer, 
2005), I adopted an iterative mix of qualitative research 
and analytic approaches which, following Wolch (2007, 
p. 382), involved getting out there and ‘wading around 
in the muck’. From a very different research tradition, 
but offering similar advice (Seyfang and Smith, 2007; 
Escobar 2007) systems theorists have developed a 
particular ‘orientation to enquiry’ which aims to make 
sense of a situation through experimental action. 
Research in this tradition expects that a range of 
opportunities to gather data will be presented over 
the course of the project, only some of which will be 
deliberate (e.g. formal interviews and focus groups). 
Other opportunities will be a spontaneous part of a 
process involving doing, learning through reflection, 
and ‘being in it’ (Burns, 2007). This orientation brings 
the benefits of enhanced understanding of the various 
components contributing to the issue at hand, and the 
ways in which they interact. 
The contrived or deliberate research methods used here 
included observations of numerous public meetings, and 
37 in-depth (usually on-site) interviews with individual 
residents and members of various community groups 
including, but not limited to, CanCERN, Greening the 
Rubble and Gap Filler. These data were augmented with 
semi-structured interviews with representatives from 
various recovery authorities, including Christchurch 
City Council (elected and non-elected), Environment 
Canterbury, the Earthquake Commission, the District 
Health Board, two insurance companies, Fletchers 
construction, and Citycare. 
Strategies for Communities
Beware geography:
The social scientific literature is replete with problematic 
references to ‘community’ (for an overview, see 
Chamberlain, Vallance and Perkins, 2010) with a central 
concern being ‘propinquity without community’ and 
‘community without propinquity’. Yet, the earthquakes 
rather forcefully demonstrated the continued importance 
of geography and the prospects of geography-based 
communities. Suddenly, people with little in common had 
a collective problem that was, literally, very grounded. As 
but one example, the earthquake damaged or destroyed 
100s of kilometres of sewers. Neighbours that may or 
may not have known each other before the earthquake 
were suddenly united in a rather intimate ways through 
these sewerage laterals that made flushing the toilet a 
very communal problem. As one interviewee told me:
 They [the Christchurch City Council (CCC)] keep 
telling me I’ve got ‘low’ flow [flush] but that’s not 
right…I’ve got ‘no flow’ really because when I flush 
it bubbles upv in my neighbour’s back yard…Now 
I’m not about to… take a dump on my neighbour’s 
lawn am I? 
v6 Member of the Kinglake Community Recovery Committee.
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The earthquake’s exposure of ‘hidden’ geographies 
like this led to the formation of CanCERN. This network 
was very explicitly based on particular geographies 
where street co-ordinators fed information through 
to a neighbourhood representative. The collective of 
neighbourhood representatives then met to discuss 
‘global’ or region-wide issues, and negotiated on 
residents’ behalf with government and non-governmental 
organisations. This initially worked well because some 
of the damage – like pockets of liquefaction or failed 
sewerage systems – could be resolved more quickly 
and more effectively when addressed holistically 
rather than on an individual household basis. It also 
manages to ‘capture’ people who might otherwise be 
left out (such as those without telephone or internet), 
and it provides a forum whereby all those people who 
suddenly have issues (and who may not be familiar with 
existing political processes, assuming they still exist) 
can be heard. Later, however, as residents left the area 
and became more dispersed, emails held the ‘affected’ 
community together.
Though geography is an obvious starting point for 
community formation, communities of interest also 
formed after the earthquake. Gap Filler and Greening 
the Rubble are held together by their enthusiasm for, 
respectively, people-arts-creativity and bio-diversity. 
They used facebook, websites, and other social media 
to good affect. 
Having dedicated people
CanCERN, Gap Filler and Greening the Rubble all 
developed a core team of people that initially drove 
the process. They spent huge amounts of time building 
support for their organisation, and they also had to 
invest ‘days and days’ developing an understanding 
of the wider situation, including entitlements, formal 
process of government and governance, regulations, 
funding opportunities, and legal requirements. There is 
an extraordinary range of unusual and often alarming 
issues to consider, many of which take time and energy 
to work through. It is not entirely unexpected, then, that 
some of the more durable and influential community 
groups can attribute their success, in part, to the fact 
that at least some of the leaders do not have full-time 
jobs (in a number of cases this is actually because their 
own or their employers’ businesses were destroyed 
in the earthquake). This has allowed them the time to 
invest in this extended sense-making project. 
Connecting with existing organisations
In the immediate aftermath of a disaster there is a need 
for resources and information to flow but, unfortunately, 
many of the pre-disaster mechanisms for doing this may 
be inoperable or slow. The emergent community may 
need time to establish more enduring governance and 
financial structures, such as becoming an Incorporated 
Society or setting up their own charitable trusts. Under 
these circumstances, appropriate resourcing is really 
important but, even if a group or organisation can secure 
some financial aid, it can be difficult to find a suitable 
repository because donors are understandably reluctant 
to put money into personal bank accounts. Gapfiller, 
Greening the Rubble and CanCERN addressed 
this problem by connecting with pre-existing NGOs; 
Canterbury Arts and Heritage Trust, Living Streets 
Aotearoa, and Delta Community House. Using a 
Memorandum of Understanding, these NGOs acted as 
both a funding repository and (loosely) ‘overseer’ until 
long-terms structural, governance and accountability 
issues could be resolved. 
Pre-existing community groups, including Residents’ 
Associations, Neighbourhood Support, and a diverse 
range of garden clubs, drama societies and the like 
have proved useful in terms of information provision, 
labour, and general encouragement.
Finding a Patron
One of the possible steps towards establishing 
credibility and ‘gaining access’ to decision-making 
fora and processes is to find a patron. Church groups 
and other pre-existing civil society groups offer 
good prospects as they tend to have a philanthropic 
disposition. It helps if the patron has a high public profile, 
good relationships with the media and other networks, 
and is not controversial or overtly political. 
Connect in many ways
Social media, like facebook, and the internet more 
generally have given extra nuance to community-
based recovery here in Christchurch. Some of the 
community initiatives I have followed over the course 
of this research are, at least to date, solely web-based. 
Other groups have shown the benefits of using various 
communication methods to access a range of potential 
members and diversity of media also allows the group 
to connect their messages with the means of delivery. 
Devastating or controversial news (‘like your house is 
munted’, for example) was thought to be best delivered 
face-to-face, whilst ‘information’ of a more factual nature 
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or less important updates (such as dates of meetings) 
could be broadcast through the mass media. Developing 
some expertise across a full range of media is part of 
a successful recovery communication strategy for both 
state and community groups. 
Identify easy victories and share the good news. 
Almost everyone interviewed for this research 
commented on the complexity and enormity of the 
recovery process. There was not only a huge range 
of problems, many of the issues were interconnected, 
and this gave the sense that the overall recovery was 
an intractable mess. Some of the more successful 
community groups dealt with this by identifying and 
seizing easy victories. Some examples were securing 
funding, finding a site, connecting with another 
organisation or key figure in the recovery effort, having 
the Christchurch City Council review an unpopular 
decision, having the Earthquake Commission review 
a procedure, and so on. It may have done little to 
address the overall ‘earthquake problem’, but these 
were achievements that consolidated membership, 
legitimised their approach, and helped in some way. 
Solid core
Several of the more successful earthquake groups have 
a core of 3 - 5 people, a steering group, who others 
often look to for direction. To the best of my knowledge 
only two of these ‘leaders’ actually knew each other 
well prior to the earthquake. Others may have been 
acquaintances but, in most cases, no previous 
relationships of note existed. Nonetheless, over the last 
6 months they have come together as a team which then 
guides the extended membership. This arrangement 
means they rarely act alone (thus they have become 
quite competent at collective decision-making) but they 
are still capable of moving quickly should the need arise. 
An observation is each of the three steering groups has 
both male and female members.
Collaborate
The enormity of recovery can be overwhelming for 
all involved and there is a risk that while waiting for 
the larger tasks to be completed the small issues are 
overlooked. In conditions of uncertainty, and when there 
is a lack of pre-existing links between the recovery 
authorities and the affected public, a good strategy 
may be to undertake a small project to build trust and 
develop a good functional relationship that will also work 
for the larger recovery process. This is really important 
in light of observations (Ward, Becker, Johnston, 
2008; Olshansky, Johnson and Topping, 2006) about 
the difficulties of inventing participatory processes 
in the aftermath of a disaster. The projects need not 
be huge, and may actually seem insignificant in the 
face of the overall recovery process, but these small 
projects might be a useful step; without them the larger 
undertaking may be compromised or even impossible. 
These collaborative projects may be the provision of 
a family fun day, or it may be the temporary repair of 
a bridge that enables children to walk to school more 
easily. Small projects demonstrate the effectiveness 
and trustworthiness of all involved and set the scene 
for later developments.
Positive action
Many of the groups observed during the course of this 
research emphasised a ‘solutions-based’ approach to 
their activities. A recurrent theme from the interviews 
and observations was the need to avoid being seen as ‘a 
bunch of whingers’ and instead offer positive strategies 
that were seen, at least by the residents, as desirable 
and achievable. This appears to be accord with some 
of the literature emerging from developing countries 
where some NGOs have moved from ‘expose-oppose’ 
or revolutionary strategies to ‘expose-oppose-propose’ 
models (Etemadi, 2004). 
Conclusions
This research provides some good (though contextual, 
situated and partial) strategies that communities and 
grassroots movements may use to develop and promote 
their cause in the post-disaster ‘scramble’. Communities 
here in Christchurch were not always ‘engaged’; indeed, 
at times over the course of this research they were not 
even adequately ‘informed’7 (IAP2’s lowest order of 
participation). This raises the prospect of looking beyond 
the civil defence and emergency management literature 
to scholarship on, for example, insurgent/radical/
informal planning for lessons about facilitating genuine 
community empowerment, and the pitfalls that may lie 
ahead for the Christchurch community organisations 
and citizens’ initiatives studied here. Etemadi (2004), for 
example, in a summary of strategies adopted by NGOs 
in developing countries has verified the utility of many 
of the strategies described above. In addition, Etemadi 
warns against becoming beholden to a particular 
7 There are numerous examples but for brevity I cite the ‘septic tanks affair’ where residents were approached one by one and asked to give their 
consent to the installation of sewage holding tanks. Some were told that if they didn’t sign they would be denying their neighbours a toilet. At 
least some people who signed were not aware the tanks would be permanent. 
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official, and suggests keeping officials at a distance 
during elections. Others have highlighted the dangers 
of focussing only on consensus-oriented, collaborative 
approaches that almost necessarily imply the dilution 
of one’s ambitions (Rutherford, 2007; Swyngedouw; 
2009). Hence, the development or preservation of 
a radical wing that preserves the original language, 
sentiments and intent of the community or grassroots 
movement may be necessary in extreme cases. Indeed, 
this may be a desirable step if the frequent observation 
(Clarke, 2008; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Coles and 
Buckle, 2004; Mitchell, 2004; Solnit, 2009) that disasters 
exacerbate existing inequalities holds true. We have 
seen the beginnings of more radical developments in 
Christchurch with two protest marches having taken 
place already, with more planned.
It is also important to note that some of the onus 
of participation lies with communities themselves. 
Participation at the IAP2’s higher levels demand 
collective effort on their part. This suggests a need 
for communities themselves to do some work, to 
become citizens rather than ‘residents’, ‘consumers’ or 
‘clients’, and get ready to be engaged with. That said, 
it is important to note that authorities can facilitate this 
process by providing funding and other resources.  
In conclusion, this research shows that we cannot 
assume the state is willing or able to effectively engage 
a public who is also willing and able to participate. This 
suggests that in spite of a robust literature outlining 
the benefits of community engagement, and even in a 
country with established democratic traditions like New 
Zealand, the early disaster recovery phase challenges 
ideals of ‘best practice’. While it is easy to blame the 
state for failing to live up to the best practice model, 
communities must also take some responsibility for 
becoming something the state can engage with. As I 
heard a Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission 
official telling a CanCERN representative, ‘I’m glad 
you’re here; if you didn’t exist we would have to 
invent you’. This paper therefore outlines a number 
of strategies that provide a useful starting point for 
communities that might face a similar struggle to be 
heard in a post-disaster clamour, and a number of 
pointers for officials who would like to see their efforts 
move beyond token consultation to more empowering 
forms of engagement.
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